This survey of European industrial policy aims to set out and explain the great significance of European integration in determining (changes in) structure and performance of industry in the EU. This influence is explored from the policy side by analysing the transformation of the framework within which both EU and Member States' industrial policy can be pursued.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 discusses at some length the division of powers between, and the complementarity of, the Member states' and EU level of government when it comes to industrial policy. A comprehensive survey is provided based on a wide and fairly detailed classification of industrial policy instruments. Section 2 will address the place and meaning of three cross-cutting issues, namely, the indiscriminate use of the 'competitiveness' label in the EU circuit of business and of policy makers, the relation between services and EU industrial policy and, finally, that of European infrastructure.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 will deal, respectively, with the three building blocks of the wide concept of industrial policy distinguished in section 1, that is, the EU framework of market integration, EU horizontal industrial policy and EU sectoral or specific industrial policy. The chapter ends with the main conclusions. The reader hopefully realizes that the subject area is much too vast to be surveyed comprehensively. Choices have to be made. One such choice is that I shall focus more on the framework and the horizontal aspects, as the incentive structure for industry and industrial markets is dominated by these two. A corollary is that section 5, on sectoral and specific policy, is limited to an overall perspective, with (brief) illustrations only about ICT and technology, while refraining from details on sectors. Another choice is to remain complementary to other authors in this volume dealing with a range of specific economic analyses which often are relevant to EU policy.
Industrial policy: what the EU and Member states do and do not
There is a great deal of confusion about what industrial policy is, only surpassed by the confusion about what European industrial policy might be. The latter is even more complicated because the EU level has ample constraining powers vis a vis Member states' instruments and their use, while at the same time the EU level itself is also restricted in its actions and does not dispose of anywhere near the same range of tools as Member states might employ, in a constrained fashion or not.
Scope and constraints of European industrial policy
Figure 1 should help to reduce such confusion to an appreciable extent. A complete resolution is beyond the capacity of the author, for the simple reason that no taxonomy can fully respect the range of views on industrial policy which can be found in the literature. The Figure 1 combines three features: a comprehensive classification of industrial policy and of other policies somehow influencing industry, a sixfold breakdown of how EU and national powers are related (see 'notes') and an application of the latter to the many distinct elements of industrial and other policies specified in the classification.
The classification begins by distinguishing two sets of policy which influence industry, yet are not part of industrial policy, namely, 'policies not for industry which affect industry' for obvious reasons (such as macroeconomic stability with fiscal and monetary instruments; redistributional tools ; agricultural and services policies; tax policy; energy; landuse, and so on) and 'policies which directly help or constrain industry but are not meant (only) for industry' (such as price controls, buy-national campaigns, tied development aid or environmental policies addressing specific hazards such as poisonous chemicals or smog).
The remainder is defined as a 'wide concept of industrial policy' and consists of three building blocks: framework aspects, horizontal industrial policy and sectoral and specific industrial policy. For all the elements specified in Figure 1 , a proxy indication is provided about the division or combination of powers at EU and Member states' levels. For a full understanding of the nature, scope and potential of EU industrial policy, all these elements would have to be explained separately, though in a coherent fashion. Given the space constraint, it should be sufficient to concentrate on the three building blocks of 'wide' industrial policy, with occasional references to other elements in the figure where appropriate. Some special attention will be paid to three such references in section 2.
Broadly speaking, the economic and institutional importance of EU industrial policy is greatest for the EU framework aspects. The respective weights of horizontal and sectoral and specific policies cannot be established in general terms. Both are constrained by the EU framework aspects as well as by other subsidiarity considerations which often -though not invariably -mean that the EU level of government has few 'hard' instruments to act. It is crucial to keep these limitations in mind when studying the flurry of EU policy documents on industrial policy, 'competitiveness' strategies or 'entreprise' policies. Most such documents are long on analytical aspects and on recommended directions on how to mend one's ways in European industrial markets, but short or relatively 'soft' on concrete actions or the employment of significant funding and other instruments. One may regard this as the inevitable outcome of a much more market-driven approach to industrial change, which is nodoubt correct, but it might just as well be seen as an explicit choice not to endow the EU level with forceful instruments and powers to influence or 'engineer' the future path of Europe's industries. Writing in 2005, the two perspectives boil down to very much the same result in terms of industrial policy potential. consists of the internal market (an extremely comprehensive concept with a strong legal basis and a powerful institutional backing) and a very modest set of 'cohesion' policies. The cohesion policies largely consist of regional instruments for relatively poor regions in the Union, and to some extent for providing funds for relatively poor countries in the EU.
'Cohesion' would seem to refer redistribution from richer to poorer areas in the EU.
Nevertheless, cohesion amounts to an efficiency-based long-run strategy of 'catch-up growth'.
The interventions are meant to accelerate catch-up growth and, once this is achieved, cohesion policies are terminated. Cohesion policies do influence industry in a number of ways but especially by improving the determinants of location and investment. However, it ought to be noted that cohesion polices do not and cannot address specific industries (or services, for that matter). Such policies are more horizontal i.e. are mainly oriented to hard (networks and roads/bridges/tunnels) and soft (human capital, technical schools, retraining facilities, administrative capacity) infrastructure. The Monetary Union in strict treaty terms comprises not only the 'eurozone' of (now) 12 countries 5 but also the non-eurozone countries in sofar as they have obligations under what the treaty calls the second stage of EMU 6 .
Internal market rationale
The hard core of the Economic Union is the internal market. A good understanding of the internal market, the logic of its design and of its proper functioning is indispensable to grasp the nature, scope and potential of EU industrial policy at the two levels of government.
An economically meaningful definition of the internal market reads as follows : 'the free movement of goods, services and factors of production as well as the right of establishment across intra-EU frontiers, accompanied by all necessary common regulation and/or policies for this internal market to function properly' 7 . What the treaty calls the 'establishment' of the internal market boils down to the accomplishment of free movement and (company) establishment, but, in actual practice, this accomplishment can often only be had if degrees of common regulation or mutual recognition are agreed first. Thus, the establishment and proper functioning are frequently pursued simultaneously. However, proper functioning implies the absence of market failures and this refers to competition policy as well. Therefore, the framework box, bottom left in Figure 1 , is mainly about the internal market : when its establishment is incomplete, it leaves a degree of freedom to Member states (the few examples left nowadays include the absence of an internal labour market and the lack of a true EU patent), and when the proper functioning is not (yet) adequately dealt with, it might refer to a lack of justified harmonisation (due to one or a few recalcitrant Member states), a lack of common standards or the slow liberalization of network industries (indeed, without a common EU regulator, unlike the case of national markets).
For the most part, however, the internal market is well established and its functioning improves with deepening and widening of scope. This will be discussed in section 3. The common regulation in 'approximated' (harmonized) or centralized form has recently become much more rigorously scrutinized under the label 'better regulation' (see section 4). The new approach of subjecting all substantive Commission proposals to regulatory impact assessment, based on an analytical methodology, is bound to influence whatever industrial policies are going to be proposed. Finally, the framework box in Figure 1 investor would not have been willing to do the same.
Horizontal industrial policy
Horizontal industrial policy is of relatively recent origin. Indeed, of the seven categories specified in the middle box at the bottom of Figure 1 , none of them existed at EU level in, say, 1980 in a meaningful way or not at all. The EU had no programmes or in-depth analyses in areas such as innovation stimuli, entrepreneurship and risk capital, skills and human capital and competitiveness tests for EU policies. Around 1980 almost all research funding was spent on nuclear and other energy research in the framework of Euratom. The first ESPRIT (on computers and IT) programme dates from 1981. An EU restructuring fund did not exist except for steel and paid by the steel mills themselves in the framework of the ECSC. And EU public procurement is too tiny to be utilized for strategic purposes and no such objective had been made explicit anyway. However, the issues in the horizontal industrial policy box were influenced by the EU level when imposing disciplines on national industrial policies under some of these rubrics. Thus, research subsidies of a 'fundamental' nature are not caught by the state aid regime but if research is 'applied' subsidies are disciplined dependent on how close the applications are to reaching the market. National restructuring programmes did exist and were subjected to complex state aid disciplines, more often than not politically influenced at the highest level of EU politics via adhoc decisions on rescue operations. National public procurement was formally disciplined by nondiscrimination provisions in the treaty and a few weak directives on goods and on public works which were hardly enforced in those days. the ECSC hardly managed to create a functioning internal steel market and never accomplished an internal market for coal. In fact, the steel market enjoyed its share of the 'golden growth era' of the EU between the mid-1950s and 1973 but an undistorted internal market in steel only came about just before the ECSC treaty was integrated in the EC treaty (in 2002) . In fact, the early and unstoppable decline in coal and the subsequent decline of steel have caused tremendous adjustment problems, often concentrated in certain regions as well, prompting all kinds of regional jobs programmes and adhoc responses. In the same period of concluding the ECSC treaty, attempts to agree on a similar sectoral treaty for agriculture (the so-called Green Pool) only just failed. However, they formed the basis of what later was to become the Common Agricultural Policy in the EEC. The Rome treaty of 1957 did not have a sectoral slant, at least not for industry, except for a minor clause in shipbuilding (which has caused subsidy problems until today). The only sectoral bias one finds is that in (the common) transport policy, which was first interpreted in a highly interventionist fashion, resulting in a delay of two decades before the ECJ in 1985 ordered the Council to speed ahead with the liberalization of intra-EU transport in all six modes.
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In art. 4, ECSC -the huge national subsidies making a mockery of internal free trade and specialization were typically defended on the basis of an escape clause in art. 95, ECSC.
The long EU struggle to come to grips with the enduring steel crisis has ultimately helped the Commission to rationalize the EU state aids regime. This is the subject of chapter 7. Suffice it here to say that, first, the consistency of EU state aid discipline over different sectors had to be accomplished, 9 second, the residual political control of the Council over the Commission's regime under art. 89, EC had to be pre-empted, 10 third, the regime had to be organized in ways similar to the rules of anti-trust with well-justified block exemptions rather than allowing scope for 'negotiating rules' for Member states time and again 11 , and, finally, the underlying economics of justifying state aids could be addressed, as was done after an invited paper by Besley and Seabright (1999) . The result of the long haul of rationalizing state aids in the EU has been a drastic reduction of national state aid in relative terms and, to some degree, even in absolute terms as well as a more rational rearrangement of the types of aid given.
A quick glance at the sectoral and specific industrial policy box, bottom right in Figure   1 , makes it clear that the Member states' discretion for such policies today is limited at best. between the EU research strategy in the horizontal box and the EU technology policies in the specific policies box is hard to draw. As sections 4 and 5 will show, both tend to shy away from 'picking winners'. For all these reasons, section 5 will only briefly touch upon two 'evergreens' in the specific policy box, namely, ICT strategy and technology policy.
The economic relevance of cross-cutting issues
Even a wide concept of industrial policy will not encompass all influences on industrial structure and performance. Conversely, when trying to encompass all such influences, the term industrial policy eventually becomes meaningless. The bottom half of There are pros and cons of the Union's shift to competitiveness policies as restrictively defined by the treaty and elaborated since 1993. First, the pros. The strategic advantages are crucial and may well dominate. They include the (virtual) termination of short-sighted and distortive interventions to rescue failing firms or sectors in decline owing to comparative disadvantage as well as the very high barriers against a policy reversal in this respect 16 . The focus is on being competitive in Europe and worldwide and this mind-set, even more than treaty texts, has pervasively changed the policy landscape in the Union. The economic advantages, especially in the long run, are obvious. Compared to the more interventionist landscape, one should expect structural adjustment both to be better anticipated by companies and sectors (knowing that the political market is largely taboo) and to be faster if severe problems nevertheless arise. In turn, this will raise productivity overall, hence growth, while presumably reducing the costs of intersectoral labour flows.
Other advantages include the more strategic economic perspective of industry as a whole rather than the crisis-prone adhocery of interventions and a politicized state aids regime. This There are significant drawbacks, too. The first seems academic, yet is likely to have profound implications for the policy-making process and to some extent its substance. 16 Consider the dire predictions of sceptical economists that the Italian car quotas against Japan (gradually relaxed and removed in the 1990s) would not actually disappear; similarly, the textile and clothing quota under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (ended late 2004) did go ; even huge import jumps in textiles and clothing from China in 2005 -though prompting a kind of voluntary export restraint by China -led only to selected and temporary import 'quotas', with some growth and at much higher levels than earlier imports while no state aids will be permitted ; remember the way the Commission dealt with restrictive practices and state aids in steel in 1994; the much stricter state aids regime for airlines was first fiercely resisted but did prevail at last ; the shipbuilding sector, with decades of struggle about hidden subsidies, has adjusted dramatically and state aids are now a trickle compared to the 1980s ; the very narrow scope of action for Member states when they announce rescue operations as with Alsthom in France in 2004 or with EKO Stahl in (East) Germany in the late 1990s ; the tightly controlled clearance under EU competition policy for crisis cartels, etc. . 17 The Maastricht treaty introduced novel and firm language about the 'economic order' of the Union in this respect. Both art.s 4, EC and 5, EC (new numbering) impose that Member states and the EU act, in all policies and measures, "in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition".
Whereas competitiveness is a straightforward notion for a single company, it is more elusive for sectors and problematic, if not controversial for countries and the EU. It is not unfair to speak of a gulf between academic economists here, and national and international policy makers 18 . For reasons of space, we shall merely refer to some of the implications.
Competitiveness is now so widely defined that it serves as a 'container' in which almost any idea can be dumped. Not only are ill-defined policies rarely good policies, the nebulous approach acts as an open invitation for (industrial) lobbies and national ministers (not least, once they occupy the rotating EU presidency) to argue attention to almost anything, resulting in waves of 'fashionable' topics. This seems to capture what has happened at EU level 19 . In fairness, the Commission understood early on that detached analysis and an apolitical organ suggesting agenda items with authority could counterbalance these risks. Thus it initiated a
Competitiveness Advisory Group bringing out a series of special reports with the prominent help of Alexis Jacquemin. In 1997, it started annual Competitiveness Reports, largely written by independent economists, and gradually providing a far more reliable analytical basis than hitherto for EU policy making and for enterprises in Europe in their strategic thinking.
Another manifestation of the 'container fallacy' is the unproductive 'repackaging' and relabelling of instruments and policies. At the symbolic level, the term 'industrial policy' went out of fashion in the mid-1990s and competitiveness policies was the label employed, even though the two Bangemann reports, as the origin of the U-turn to competitiveness concerns in a pro-market approach, utilised "industrial policy". In 1999, however, 'entreprise policy' suddenly appears as a new term 20 and seems to be employed, first, as a subset of competitiveness policy dealing with issues of special (but not exclusive) importance to 18 Although the debate is not entirely comparable with that on the (multiple) definitions of industrial policy, it does echo some of its traits and is equally conceptual and perpetual. For discussion, see the attack by Krugman (1994) , and partial reconciliations by Jacquemin and Pench (1997) and Galli and Pelkmans (2000) ; see also Lawton (1999) . The Commission embraced the OECD definition of 'competitiveness' in the mid1990s as "..the ability of companies, industries and regions, nations or supranational regions to generate, while being and remaining exposed to international competition, relatively high factor income and factor employment levels on a sustainable basis". The ultimate object here is standards of living (e.g. of the EU) and the suggestion is that nations 'compete' as if they are firms. The Krugman critique applies here, of course. The World Economic Forum, influenced by Porter-type of notions that countries somehow do compete (because their natural endowments matter less and less) by means of alternative economic institutions and strategies, clearly appeals more to policy makers, even if the analytical and statistical basis of the WEF reports leave much to be desired. Among the many questions which can be raised when using many disparate policies but most of these policies are effectuated at the national level.
Starting at pure EU initiatives, without realizing this context, would be flawed.
Does EU services market integration matter for EU industrial policy?
Services generate about 70 per cent of the value-added of the EU. Clearly, from the demand side the development of the services sector is important for industry as it is bound to be the largest aggregate customer. The question we address here is on the supply side. Do services matter for the dynamic economic performance of EU industry and, if so, does EU services market integration matter for EU industrial policy?
Although all services may have some significance for efficiency, productivity trends and innovation in industry, it is useful first to distinguish government from market services, and, in turn, business-related services from other market services. We focus on business- The rapid growth of business-related services is usually attributed to outsourcing, implying that a good deal of the fall of manufacturing jobs represents in fact a migration of jobs to services. This is undoubtedly the case, resulting from a search for cost cutting and a focus on 'core' business, but there are several other, more deep-seated reasons for this growth as well.
Certain relatively new services have become vital for industrial performance, IT services and software above all, but also logistics (with scale-driven production, logistics are critical to performing in the entire internal market both for deliveries and for just-in-time processes). Furthermore, with production 'europeanizing' in Europe-wide firms, a range of professional services and selected other ones no longer have to be sourced locally because these providers may 'follow' the europeanization of the MNCs either by local establishment or by crossborder services on request (but based on a relationship of trust, indispensable for services supply).
It is therefore important for the competitiveness of European industry that the internal markets for services function properly. The recent liberalization of network industries in the Union has thus far selectively helped business (industry and services) to cut input costs such as in lower telecoms, postal, air transport and energy bills for a given set of services. The liberalization of financial markets has been favourable to wholesale customers (sizable business clients) but far less, unfortunately for SMEs and private clients. And there is a hesitant beginning of greater market pressures for professional services and more liberal regulation for example on entry. In marketing and advertising, serious restrictions in some EU countries have remained (despite vigorous efforts, led by the Commission, to overcome them) on the grounds of consumer protection. 28 It is probably inappropriate to generalize about the development of service quality and of the emergence of innovative services but it is possible to identify submarkets where EU liberalization has improved the quality of services 29 and significantly widened the range and innovativeness of services 30 . So, the internal market for services matters to industry and a deepening, widening and better functioning of it is crucial for the competitiveness of manufacturing in Europe. 28 For some background and data supporting these contentions, see e.g. SEC (2004) However, European industry should not focus solely on the internal market for services. A very dynamic subset of services, namely ICT services, turn out to be distinctly less dynamic than their counterparts in the USA 31 and this is not so much due to defects in the internal market as to other restraints of competition and attitudes being more risk averse, besides less deep ICT investment and a skill gap (see Denis et al., 2005) . In this sense, horizontal policies which would probably benefit both services and industry are relevant here, but most of these issues (such as educational; skill gaps; subtle restraints of competition in services via excessive reliance of consumer protection; hindering rapid change because of employment protection laws and so on) have to be addressed at the Member states' level, given the current assignment of powers to the EU level.
Is European infrastructure crucial for European industry ?
In a trivial sense, of course, infrastructure matters greatly for any modern economy.
The questions for this contribution are, first, whether it matters in a special way for Another implied question to be answered is the relation between public capital and economic growth. This complicated issue has generated a huge literature. The survey by Romp and de Haan (2005) finds that the recent, more sophisticated, analyses do find a positive relationship but far more modest than the influential one in Aschauer (1989) . The heterogeneity amongst countries is also great, for reasons of the size and quality of the existing capital stock, non-linearities caused by network effects and institutional and political factors. The authors warn that additional investment, though perhaps politically more rewarding, is no good measure if it pulls away money required for a proper maintenance of the physical stock in place, a problem not rarely encountered in Europe. A third question to be answered is whether the EU-15 suffers from a lack of public capital, that is, whether the stock of public capital is 'suboptimal'. Again, this cannot be a pure industry or even a pure business issue. Both modelling (see for example Romp and de Haan, 2005) and empirical analytical problems (see Kamp, 2005 ) explain why it is so difficult to come up with authoritative answers. Kamp holds that, in 2000, all EU-14 countries but two had ratios of public to private capital that exceeded the growth-maximizing value; the same is true for the EU-14 average. In network industries such as gas and electricity, markets themselves normally pay for infrastructure. The question here is mainly whether interconnectors across borders are built (and by whom), knowing that this would invite more competition given third-party access. In freight rail the relevance for industry is probably most obvious. Rail freight in Europe is expensive, slow and of mixed quality as far as business customers' wants are concerned.
Liberalization (see di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans, 2004) that account), capacity problems are expected once a modal shift to rail at lower cost and better quality takes place.
A somewhat different issue played in air transport where delays and expensive rerouting of planes were due to the absence of a common air traffic infrastructure (with tremendous inefficiencies as a result) and a routing system where national interests (usually the military) were allowed to assume a very large part of the air corridors without any weighing of competing European civil aviation interests. In telecoms and the internet, in contrast, the liberalization of the former has generated major expenditure on B2B high speed networks (indeed, with excess of so-called 'dark fibre') and Europe is rapidly responding to the broadband challenge for B2C and C2C connections (see COM (2004) Western Europe, clearly, the quantity and more often the quality of infrastructure will have to be improved over a period of decades. EU cohesion and structural funds can provide so much support that the risks of crowding out could be minimized (although co-financing will always imply some risk in this respect).
EU framework conditions for industrial policy
Both national and EU industrial policies are severely constrained by the EU framework of the internal market, complemented by its common polices and cohesion. This is not surprising as it reflects the fundamental choice of Member states to achieve economic progress, formulated in the EU's economic objectives, via a deep and well-functioning internal market. The internal market is governed by far-reaching instruments such as free movement and free establishment which purposefully reduce national policy autonomy in areas which might affect, actually or potentially, cross-border economic intercourse. Art. well-known that national autonomy is greatly circumscribed and, in addition, the European mind-set is much more pro-competition or pro-market than several decades ago. Looking at Figure 2 , national industrial policies cannot affect free movement and free establishment. The case law in this area goes very far and severely limits policy action that is in some sense discriminatory (for companies from other EU countries) or distorts free movement/establishment. Thus, 'golden shares' of national governments in privatized former utilities have been condemned by the ECJ as going against the free movement of capital, here, the equal opportunity of all potential shareholders in the Union. Similarly, in overcoming market failures of the internal market (see (a) in the second row, second column), all five items greatly limit national discretion, even if full uniformity of EU rules is not applicable.
Thus, mutual recognition even dispenses with common rules, but it imposes equivalence and otherwise falls back on the strict requirements of free movement (see for example Pelkmans, 2002 
Horizontal EU industrial policy
The main emphasis nowadays in the Union is on horizontal industrial policy. A sharp definition of what 'horizontal ' means in actual practice is not easy. The term probably originates from the desire not to intervene sectorally (vertically) and to defend policy makers against ad-hoc pressures for rescue operations and direct interventions in single enterprises.
Such 'specific' industrial policy, another term often used, is not desirable in case declining industries or badly performing companies ask to be helped by the state, nor is the state any better than market players at 'picking winners' for the future. At the same time, the boundaries between the framework conditions (see section 3) and horizontal policy are not always clearcut and the distinction between the two is, at times, fluid.
35 Which implies quite an intrusive mix of competition policy and pro-competitive regulation, see Pelkmans, 2001. 36 In principle, art. 296, EC, goes further than mere state ownership because the latter can prevent any (including a hostile) take-over but cannot change the competitive environment of the company. Its application might be possible for military goods and for goods and services vital for national security, but this would only work if the goods and services are of a purely military nature. As soon as so-called dualpurpose goods are produced (and that is likely to be the case for most of these sectors), much of the discretion disappears since free movement and undistorted competition apply.
Another problem in setting out a proper picture of EU horizontal industrial policy is that the overall scope of this approach is vast, too vast for a chapter like the present one. To get around this difficulty, this section will employ two summary representations of crucial EU policy papers which give a rich impression of the EU horizontal approach and which can be used for annotations in the text. Elaboration of the economic analysis underlying the initiatives (or the lack of it) is impossible for reasons of space. Doing justice to the many interesting initiatives and their rate of success is equally unfeasible. In Figures 3 and 4 
DRIVE:
• EU industry has improved its competitiveness The overall impression of the 1994 Commission paper is that the EU was still searching for an effective common approach between the Member states, the EU level and EU industry as the principal actor. The horizontal approach of 2004, summarized in Figure 4 , is definitely wider in scope and almost certainly better equipped with ideas, funds and (sometimes) instruments. This contrast is not to be interpreted as that, therefore, it is more 'effective ' in accomplishing goals or somehow 'better'. Such an assessment is very difficult to make, given the vast areas of activities, the constraints in terms of powers specified in Figure   1 . and the potential or actual gaps between the desired results in policies and the genuine impact on European business. It is good to see the main reasons for the greater ambition in horizontal EU industrial policy after the turn of the century. The instrumental reasons include 37 Coherence especially with structural policy and with criteria for EU (as opposed to national) subsidies. • worrying combination of (too) slow structural change and selective (but not general) 'delocalisation' • disappointing EU performance in productivity growth, research and innovation • too weak risk-taking & entrepreneurship • EU has still assets and many opportunities (e.g. intrabranch) • Eastern enlargement reorganize value-chains for competitiveness and growth PRIORITIES 'better law-making' approach, combining a 'deeper' internal market, with a lower regulatory 'burden' 'integrated approach' to competitiveness, in 5 areas (knowledge, the I.M., cohesion, sustainable development, worldwide dimension) underlines that reallocation of productive factors and structural change more generally are inevitable processes (for productivity trends to go up) which should not be resisted. However, its analysis shows that a too slow structural change, combined with selective delocalization, is a menace to Europe's recovery and growth trend. The Commission is right in emphasizing the problem of too weak risk taking and entrepreneurship but, surprisingly, nowhere in the paper is its initiative on 'Entrepreneurship in Europe' even mentioned. 38 Of course, it is exceptionally difficult to influence deep-seated inhibitions against risk-taking in Europe but both the limited impact from taking barriers away for SMEs and de nuovo companies and the insistence that risk taking be rewarded and not discouraged is undoubtedly worth including in its horizontal industrial policy. Fortunately, the drives in Figure 4 The first priority, 'better lawmaking', goes beyond industry alone, of course. However, since much of the acquis can be found in the area of goods regulation, occupational health and safety, and environment, affecting industry directly, European industry regards a lower regulatory burden as a handmaiden to competitiveness. The question is really whether the EU can deal with market failures in a least-cost fashion without compromising the objectives.
Since these organs are the supreme political organs in the EU, it seems hard to imagine that they will accept such self discipline all the time. Moreover, a good deal of potential excess legislation. This chapter is not the place to assess the RIA approach and its effectiveness for the EU public interest (but see Radaelli, 2003 and Renda, 2006 , for instance). It is also too early to assess whether the 'regulatory burden' for European industry is likely to go down as a result of these initiatives. One should not forget that there may well be justifiable reasons for those burdens if market failures have to be overcome. The empirical issue is, rather, whether European industry is unduly burdened because interventions are not based on market failures or not on well-defined objectives, or, entail higher costs than benefits for society (hence, a regulatory failure replaces a market failure), or, because costs of rules are disproportionate even if the net social benefit is positive. The biggest case so far (on REACH, the new chemicals regulatory regime) shows how complex such assessments are likely to be (Pelkmans, 2005-b) . It is nevertheless progress that these issues are now squarely faced in the Union and thus can at least pre-empt true excesses while forcing political decision-makers to be clear and accountable for the choices they make. The status of the other two items (impact of the existing acquis and the problem of 'cumulative impact') is much less clear. large questionmarks because, by definition, these are far more sensitive still, and inevitably will take a decade or more to tackle satisfactorily.
The multi-policy approach to competitiveness is rich and better endowed with resources and powers than was possible ten years ago. Every single item of the list under this heading in Figure 4 is worth a chapter in the present volume. The following can be no more than a few brief annotations for the guidance of the reader. We shall limit ourselves to three areas : research, innovation and human capital.
The European Research Area has emerged from the Lisbon process's requirement that public and private R&D in the EU should be pushed up from 1.9 per cent (in 2001) to 3 per cent of GDP. Even more than public R&D it is business R&D in Europe which is lagging behind the USA and Japan. 42 The subsequent action plan 43 envisaged three lines of policy :
improving the effectiveness of public support for research, redirecting public budgets towards R&D, and improving the framework conditions for research. For the first line, the so-called 'open process of coordination' in the Lisbon framework was utilized which is of doubtful utility, to put it mildly (for instance Pelkmans and Casey, 2004) . The Sapir report (Sapir et al., 2003) stressed the current avoidance rather than the search for excellence and recommended a European Research Council based on the competitive model of the USA. But, since the bulk of public money for R&D is national in the EU (some 94 per cent), it would only help if a good deal of this national money was also subjected to competition and peer review on a European basis. Redirecting public money towards R&D is always tough, but particularly so when budget constraints are tight in a period of very low growth. At EU level economists have suggested a radical switch away from agricultural support to R&D 44 but this is fiercely resisted. The framework for research has everything to do with the overall prospects for top quality business and academic research in the Union and with the motives behind the brain drain of many thousands of researchers towards the USA. These issues, too long disregarded in the Union, are now frantically studied and the debate is at last beginning to be led by leading researchers themselves. 45 However, the inhibitions are deep-seated in academic
Europe and career prospects, sustained funding of basic research and a range of other problems will have to be addressed in a convincing fashion.
42 See e.g. COM (2002) 51 An interesting illustration is given by a Box in the Sapir report, based on unpublished work from Philippe Aghion, showing the growing importance of human capital for innovation at the productivity frontier. For both total factor productivity and labour productivity, the regression of the interaction between distance to the technological frontier and skilled labour is positive and significant. See Sapir et al, 2003, op. cit., p.33 52 Kok et al., 2003, Jobs, jobs, jobs, creating The other four areas mentioned in the right/bottom column of Figure 4 are in fact other policy areas with an interface with industrial policy: aspects of EU competition policy, further deepening of the internal market, cohesion and questions of access to third markets. This testifies to the incredible scope and complexity of horizontal industrial policy. At times, it is more insightful to call this approach the constant attention to opportunities and risks for industry in Europe when it comes to other EU policies and strategies, rather than a policy of its own.
Sectoral and specific European industrial policy
Sectoral and specific industrial policy of the old days has largely disappeared. In this sense, the sectoral and specific industrial policy of the EU has modernized and become far more modest. Sectoral interventions are limited to a few remnants of the past (such as lingering but dwindling subsidies in coal; perhaps the R&D support for Airbus under the 'Community interest' clause (art. 87. 3.b., EC) and some remaining subsidies in shipbuilding; a handful of more explicit forms of industrial protection via trade policy such as a few quotas in steel and aluminium against some former USSR republics). All of these are national except the quotas, with the Commission exercising supervision, and on the way out, some faster than others. competitive positioning and (may) search for R&D elements which the EU could usefully support. This fairly consistent approach is the counterpart of the focus on horizontal policy and the reliance on the overall EU framework. It is undoubtedly a significant improvement on protectionist, ad hoc, politicized or anti-adjustment interventions or plain nationalism. Two and a half decades ago, an entire range of sectors was subject to sectoral European industrial policy of the old variety, in one way or another, via the relaxing of state aid supervision, explicit (often 'grey') protectionism, special regulations, anti-dumping and so on. Around 1980, the range came to include cars, aircraft, shipbuilding, coal, steel, textiles and clothing, railway rolling stock, telecoms equipment, consumer electronics and so on. Picking winners took place as well in often ingenious ways.
Nowadays, while such bad policy making is avoided, it is not so easy to find out whether good policy has taken its place. Good industrial policy might be verified as correcting or improving upon market functioning, in particular dynamic efficiency, and as being least-cost. The present chapter cannot go into the numerous sectoral policy papers the Commission has published since 1991; it would be too encyclopaedic and it would be impossible to do justice to specialized and useful analyses. Many sectors have been subject to such broadly encouraging but largely non-interventionist 'policies', based on specialized study groups and High Level panels and with wide consultation of the sectors involved. Examples include textiles and clothing, cars, trains (both for new technology and for interoperability purposes), aircraft, new materials like 'new ceramics ' and superhard fibres, chemicals (culminating in new proposals to transform regulations in such a way that innovation would not be discouraged, as is now the case ; this has become the REACH process), biotechnology, shipbuilding, telecoms equipment (especially the attempt to keep the advantages EU companies had acquired with GSM, in 3G equipment), environmental technologies and so on. It is nonetheless worthwhile to digress briefly on two aspects because they are critical for the reader to appreciate some remaining specifics of EU industrial policies of today, namely the EU's preoccupation with ICT, and its changing approach to technology policy. definition cross-border and in the European public interest. They happen to be critical from a user perspective. Indeed, the uncertainty or incompleteness holds back deeper investments in many ways while suppressing new e-practices such as eMoney. From a still broader perspective, that of Lisbon and economic growth, the swifter adoption and wider deployment of ICT hardware and software is crucial to obtaining a higher trend growth in Europe 59 . In future, the demands aspects are to be widened to multi-media and contents orientation among others. The idea is that ICT investment, much lower in Europe than in the USA and in Japan, relative to GDP, can only be stimulated in the long run if the dynamics of the (internal) market provides the opportunities. It remains to be seen whether i2010 60 is genuinely going to be more effective but it would seem to represent a policy approach no longer built on grand illusions and no longer prioritized from the existing (EU) supply side.
EU technology policy began in earnest with the Single Act of 1985 when it was given a legal base. Framework programmes began a few years earlier but were heavily biased towards energy under Euratom. Nevertheless, even the term "technology policies" is not clear at the EU level because R&D is often called 'research' whereas large parts of framework programmes also dealt and deal with applications in potential or close-to-market technologies.
Besides, there was the EUREKA programme, largely market-driven and not accompanied by With the internal market gradually becoming more integrated and cross-border mergers easier over time, the Europeanization of industry has also changed the technology landscape drastically. It is a moot question whether EU technology programmes were effective in the first decade or so. They tended to be splintered over far too many 'priorities' and compromised excellence by replacing technological leadership by equity criteria (such as all Member states 'getting reasonable shares'). They suffered from initial asymmetry of information between the Commission and business about where 'needs' could be identified, 59 See in particular Roeger, 2004, and Veugelers, 2005 as well as van Ark, 2004 risking picking winners or protecting losers. Gradually, in scaling up to the sixth and seventh framework programmes with ever rising sums of EU money (substituting for national efforts presumably), priorities have been reduced to a few and a much more rational assessment of the state of the art preceded choices, with a shift to a more market-driven approach such as the new "technology platforms". Technology platforms bring together for a number of years the entire array of companies and centres having received R&D subsidies for a specific subject matter in order to induce synergies and mutual inspiration, and possibly a larger range of marketable products. Such platforms may be the origin of new standards, new ideas, new combinations, etc. They attract market participants looking for certain applications as well.
The platforms do not receive money other than the original R and D subsidies, while the Commission expects progress reports to be done there, with all the expert and commercial exposure available.
Where the EU has only slowly improved its technology policy is in the corporate environment. First, the common EU patent was voted down in 2004 on trivial and provincial language excuses of only two countries, a very costly failure; patenting in the EU costs on average five times as much as in the USA. Second, the competitive environment has become tougher in the internal market over time and, for companies beyond a minimum size, this might be expected to spur the search for new technologies and products. Unfortunately, the overall R&D carried out by EU business is much less, relatively, than business R&D in Japan or the USA. Moreover, some relocation of high-tech research (for example in pharmaceuticals) to the USA and even to China (in electronics) has prompted questions about the lack of stimulus for quality research in technology in Europe.
Finally, Europe has only moderate R&D in defence, in sharp contrast with the USA.
To the extent that defence R&D generates spin-offs sooner or later, or creates a common cost base for civil and military products, the Union may be at a disadvantage. Repeated attempts to combine at least defence research in the EU have not been very effective. The probable sidelining of the draft Constitution is a setback in this respect because it would provide a basis for a special agency in this area, based on voluntary collaboration.
All in all, the sectoral and specific EU industrial policies are by no means dead, but have altered radically in nature while having become on the whole non-interventionist. Of course, this chapter cannot hope to assess their factual effectiveness, nor does it pretend to do so. The only major weakness so far not seriously addressed is the failure to optimize the twolevel problem, so strongly argued by Eaton et al. (1998) . One cannot be surprised about the problem of 'free riding' at the Member states level in a two-level technology policy, without strict two-level coordination. The EU level has no say on the national policies, their 'waste' or excessive duplication horizontally or with the EU, or indeed on their deplorable quality where relevant. However, the national spending is easily more than 90 per cent of total European expenditure. That is why a future European Agency for Research, if ever adopted by the Council, should be given a mandate to deal as well, and on a competitive basis, with a part of national subsidized R and D. The issue here is not whether a Member state would thereby lose its power to subsidize, but, rather, whether 'peer review' can ensure a high minimum level of quality and originality. This is similar to technology platforms where a kind of perhaps informal peer review, but with applications in mind, disciplines and stimulates high tech output at high minimum levels.
Conclusions
European industrial policy cannot be understood by focusing solely on technology,
ICT and a few other specific stimulating policies. It is indispensable to assume a broad perspective with a good appreciation of the EU framework determining largely both the constraints at Member states' level and the considerable limits of action at the EU level, besides an understanding of what initiatives are feasible, and how, with respect to 'horizontal' and 'specific' industrial policies. The upshot has been that industrial dynamics in the Union have become ever more firmly determined by market pressures in a meanwhile very big Economic Union (with no fewer than 455 million consumers up to 485 million in 2007) and by exposure to globalization, given very low industrial trade protection and the absence of barriers to FDI (as well as national treatment). Inevitably, EU industrial policy has therefore drifted into endeavours to strengthen fundamental determinants of competitiveness, to some degree corresponding to dynamic comparative advantage. Hence there is the 'horizontal' emphasis on research strategies, skills and human capital and a general promotion of innovation throughout industry. Moreover, this accords well with the deepening of the internal market, still going on, and the consistency of EU competition policy, in reducing distorting state aid and severely limiting the scope for discriminatory or distortive promotion of 'national champions'. In addition, endeavours have been made to facilitate SMEs and 'entrepreneurship' by cutting red tape and making access to venture capital easier. Over the last few years, political leaders, calling for a new industrial policy against de-industrialization, acknowledged this horizontal perspective when they merely insisted on reducing the burden on industry arising from new EU regulation, while refraining from a systemic policy reversal.
Sectoral and specific industrial policy, so familiar from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s has almost entirely disappeared at the Member states' level. It is no longer tolerated at the EU level, given that treaty amendments and accepted supervision policy have become routine. At the EU level, such interventionist policy (other than once tolerating it for Member states) could only be supported via trade policy. Also the latter has lost a good deal of its tools, with the possible exception of anti-dumping action (under WTO constraints and tightened EU law). Nowadays, the EU institutions are very active in stimulating a better sectoral environment in many sectors but this is no longer done by means of protection, distortive subsidies (funds go to adjustment, retraining or research) or permissive competition policy.
Policy reversals are not totally excluded (witness the temporary constraints in Chinese textile exports) if pressures are extreme but there is no doubt that competitiveness and hence adjustment retain overriding importance. The EU has greatly increased technology funding (quite often as a corollary of research programmes) in areas such as new materials, space, hydrogen, health and environmental technologies. Also here, the EU level seeks to avoid a 'picking winners' approach by letting technology forums develop where many ideas and applications can blossom.
This chapter has not discussed the (in)effectiveness of EU industrial policies. Even if partial, this would be a difficult exercise given the multidimensional nature of policies and the importance of constraints and/or the absence of powers for the EU level. For research and technology, however, the most visible element presumably of policy today, there is undoubtedly a serious lack of coordination in a two-level game. It is essential that the research climate in Europe become more demanding, challenging and promising (hence stopping the brain drain), that quality be stimulated by a tough peer review approach, and that excessive duplication at the two levels be avoided. However, even these measures may not be sufficient.
After all, European industry (and services even less) invests much less in R&D than Japanese and US business and, unless their output and subsequent innovation to markets are systematically far better than their rivals in Japan and the USA -an assumption that would go against all evidence -, this underperformance is bound to erode competitiveness amongst developed economies in the longer run. Apparently, it is not so much the size of the internal market but its proper (and dynamic) functioning which might lead EU companies to hold back on R&D.
